📝 SummarXiv

Abstract

Evaluating the safety of frontier AI systems is an increasingly important concern, helping to measure the capabilities of such models and identify risks before deployment. However, it has been recognised that if AI agents are aware that they are being evaluated, such agents may deliberately hide dangerous capabilities or intentionally demonstrate suboptimal performance in safety-related tasks in order to be released and to avoid being deactivated or retrained. Such strategic deception - often known as "sandbagging" - threatens to undermine the integrity of safety evaluations. For this reason, it is of value to identify methods that enable us to distinguish behavioural patterns that demonstrate a true lack of capability from behavioural patterns that are consistent with sandbagging. In this paper, we develop a simple model of strategic deception in sequential decision-making tasks, inspired by the recently developed survival bandit framework. We demonstrate theoretically that this problem induces sandbagging behaviour in optimal rational agents, and construct a statistical test to distinguish between sandbagging and incompetence from sequences of test scores. In simulation experiments, we investigate the reliability of this test in allowing us to distinguish between such behaviours in bandit models. This work aims to establish a potential avenue for developing robust statistical procedures for use in the science of frontier model evaluations.