Analysis of Bluffing by DQN and CFR in Leduc Hold'em Poker

Tarik Zaciragic, Aske Plaat, K. Joost Batenburg

公開日: 2025/9/4

Abstract

In the game of poker, being unpredictable, or bluffing, is an essential skill. When humans play poker, they bluff. However, most works on computer-poker focus on performance metrics such as win rates, while bluffing is overlooked. In this paper we study whether two popular algorithms, DQN (based on reinforcement learning) and CFR (based on game theory), exhibit bluffing behavior in Leduc Hold'em, a simplified version of poker. We designed an experiment where we let the DQN and CFR agent play against each other while we log their actions. We find that both DQN and CFR exhibit bluffing behavior, but they do so in different ways. Although both attempt to perform bluffs at different rates, the percentage of successful bluffs (where the opponent folds) is roughly the same. This suggests that bluffing is an essential aspect of the game, not of the algorithm. Future work should look at different bluffing styles and at the full game of poker. Code at https://github.com/TarikZ03/Bluffing-by-DQN-and-CFR-in-Leduc-Hold-em-Poker-Codebase.