📝 SummarXiv

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used as synthetic agents in social science, in applications ranging from augmenting survey responses to powering multi-agent simulations. Because strong prediction plus conditioning prompts, token log-probs, and repeated sampling mimic Bayesian workflows, their outputs can be misinterpreted as posterior-like evidence from a coherent model. However, prediction does not equate to probabilism, and accurate points do not imply calibrated uncertainty. This paper outlines cautions that should be taken when interpreting LLM outputs and proposes a pragmatic reframing for the social sciences in which LLMs are used as high-capacity pattern matchers for quasi-predictive interpolation under explicit scope conditions and not as substitutes for probabilistic inference. Practical guardrails such as independent draws, preregistered human baselines, reliability-aware validation, and subgroup calibration, are introduced so that researchers may engage in useful prototyping and forecasting while avoiding category errors.