📝 SummarXiv

Abstract

We propose an evolutionary model to study the transition toward green technology under the influence of innovation. Clean and dirty technologies are selected according to their profitability under an environmental tax, which depends on the overall pollution level. Pollution itself evolves dynamically: it results from the emissions of the two types of producers, naturally decays, and is reduced through the implementation of the current abatement technology. The regulator collects tax revenues and allocates them between the implementation of the existing abatement technology and its innovation, which increases the stock of knowledge and thereby enhances abatement effectiveness. From a static perspective, we show the existence of steady states, both with homogeneous populations of clean or dirty producers and with heterogeneous populations where both technologies coexist. We discuss the mechanisms through which these steady states emerge and how they may evolve into one another. From a dynamical perspective, we characterize the resulting scenarios, showing how innovation can foster a green transition if coupled with a suitable level of taxation. At the same time, we investigate how improper environmental policies may also produce unintended outcomes, such as environmental deterioration, reversion to dirty technology, or economic unsustainability.