📝 SummarXiv

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) have gained widespread recognition for their superior comprehension and have been deployed across numerous domains. Building on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) ideology, Large Reasoning models (LRMs) further exhibit strong reasoning skills, enabling them to infer user intent more accurately and respond appropriately. However, both LLMs and LRMs face the potential safety risks under jailbreak attacks, which raise concerns about their safety capabilities. Current safety evaluation methods often focus on the content dimensions, or simply aggregate different attack methods, lacking consideration of the complexity. In fact, instructions of different complexity can reflect the different safety capabilities of the model: simple instructions can reflect the basic values of the model, while complex instructions can reflect the model's ability to deal with deeper safety risks. Therefore, a comprehensive benchmark needs to be established to evaluate the safety performance of the model in the face of instructions of varying complexity, which can provide a better understanding of the safety boundaries of the LLMs. Thus, this paper first quantifies "Reasoning Complexity" as an evaluable safety dimension and categorizes 15 jailbreak attack methods into three different levels according to the reasoning complexity, establishing a hierarchical Chinese-English jailbreak safety benchmark for systematically evaluating the safety performance of LLMs. Meanwhile, to fully utilize unique language characteristics, we first propose some Chinese jailbreak attack methods, including the Chinese Character Disassembly attack, Lantern Riddle attack, and Acrostic Poem attack. A series of experiments indicate that current LLMs and LRMs show different safety boundaries under different reasoning complexity, which provides a new perspective to develop safer LLMs and LRMs.